By Dawn Marsh Riggs
Assistant Professor
California State University, Fullerton, May 5, 2006

The history of the Lenape begins when the creator, Kishelemukong, forms North America out of the mud on a turtle’s back. This omnipotent creator is also responsible for giving life to other divine entities, all members of a sacred family. The sun and thunder are the elder brothers, corn is the mother, three of the four directions are grandfathers and the south is grandmother. All life on Turtle Island is infused with a spiritual force, animals, astronomical phenomenon, even weather. Kishelemukong created a first woman and first man out of the trees that emerged on Turtle Island, from whom all Lenape descend. According to this traditional history, life, from birth to death, is a journey to immortality or reuniting with the creator and only obtainable by living a right life. Heeding the guidance of spiritual helpers and the faithful practice of ceremonies and rituals, which honor the creator and everything on Turtle Island, is fundamental to successfully completing this journey.¹ The ethical underpinnings of this spiritual worldview are based on reciprocity, balance and peaceful co-existence in the world and they give shape to Lenape spiritual life as well as their social, political and economic practices. The people living in the Delaware River valley and its environs in the centuries before the European invasion were well acquainted with diplomatic strategies that would preserve and protect the place they called Lenapehoking. Understanding their approach to managing their historic occupation of the region is central to the premise that Lenape people established a “peaceable kingdom” long before they encountered their first European immigrants. Their interactions with the Susquehannock, Dutch and Swedish settlers who moved into the region during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries illuminates the methods and means they employed to maintain a hold on the resources and lands they had cultivated for centuries. The impact the Lenape had on colonial land policies in this extraordinary period of change and conflict were largely responsible for the pre-existing stability and prosperity in the peaceable kingdom William Penn inherited in 1682. The meaning and importance of Lenapehoking as a place is critical to understanding Lenape flexibility and their willingness to share resources and negotiate shared sovereignty with the multiple waves of newcomers.

The Lenape philosophy of sovereignty and land ownership during the colonial period is pivotal to explaining their responses to European immigration and their eventual dispossession of the lands in southeastern Pennsylvania. Current scholarship acknowledges the vast differences between the indigenous North American and western European perceptions regarding land use and governance, but few studies have examined the diversity of those principles from the indigenous perspective. Scholars readily note the distinctions between Dutch, Swedish, French and English colonizing systems and their Judaic-Christian philosophical and ideological foundations. However, most analyses of Native American responses to European colonization focus largely on Indian actions and reactions to the diverse colonial systems. Rarely do they take into account the intellectual and spiritual motivations for the diversity of Indian responses. Lenape philosophical and ethical tenets shaped the choices they made as communities and individuals in very specific ways.

Inquiries into the worldview and historical mythology of the Lenape Indians inevitably lead to the controversy surrounding the Walam Olum. The Walam Olum, an epic tale of Lenape migration has dominated scholarship that attempted to understand the origins and history of the Lenape people. First published in 1836, naturalist Constantine Samuel Rafinesque claimed he had inherited wooden tablets inscribed with the epic story of Lenape migration across the Bering Land Bridge 3,600 years ago. Leading scholars of Lenape studies included evidence from Rafinesque’s transcriptions to support the growing consensus for the Bering Land Bridge hypothesis for the peopling of North America and to corroborate their own suppositions about Lenape history prior to the European invasion. Historians, ethnologists and linguists--Daniel Brinton, Frank Speck, and Paul A.W. Wallace, believed the Walam Olum contained crucial evidence regarding indigenous migrations and early mound-building cultures.² As late as 1987, C.A. Weslager reaffirmed his confidence in the document’s authenticity despite decades of mounting evidence to the contrary. Recent scholarship has finally refuted the document’s authenticity, but the influence and misinformation remains imbedded in the limited but influential historical publications about the Lenape.³

Current Lenape oral traditions demonstrate a northeastern woodlands identity, although most Lenape today reside in Canada and Oklahoma. A group’s mythology, especially when the mythology relies on an oral tradition, borrows themes, characters, and events from the everyday landscape as well as from their regional neighbors. This is especially relevant when applied to an epic myth that produces endless variations and episodes as in the creation of the world or the beginnings of cultural customs and rituals. These stories and histories change overtime and are influenced by the temporal needs of the people and their communities. However, some of the most significant themes in Lenape oral traditions date back to their earliest encounters with Europeans and clearly establish their link to the environments and cultures of the northeastern United States. One of these traditions, the creation of turtle island, is shared by other northeastern indigenous cultures, including both Iroquoian and Algonquian-speaking groups. Elements that establish a link to specific geographic locations are present in many cultural traditions. Turtles, mud, water and tall tress with deep roots are environmentally specific and would not be a part of the cosmology of a desert people or people who live in the grasslands.⁴

The environmental and geographic specifics of a culture’s historical traditions are often the framework around which their worldview is built. For example, Judaic-Christian traditions, which fueled the worldview of European colonists, emerged from a Mediterranean and desert environment. In this worldview, desert and sea landscapes and the sheep, goats and fish that occupy these environments are fundamental to the historical relevance of these accounts and provide the metaphors and imagery for the spiritual and ideological values of those societies. Likewise, environmental qualities shared by the indigenous peoples of North America’s eastern woodlands utilized the forests, rivers and certain animals specific to those landscapes in their creation of an equally diverse assortment of social, economic, religious and political systems.

The eastern woodlands identity imbedded in Lenape history helped to shape their worldview but it did not place any limitations or real boundaries on where the Lenape homeland was located. In the seventeenth-century the Lenape occupied an area that included southeastern New York and New Jersey to the north, the east bank of the Susquehanna River valley to the west, the piedmont uplands of northern Delaware to the south and the Atlantic Ocean to the east. Both New York and Philadelphia were trade centers controlled by the Lenape and they inhabited all the land that comprises the Philadelphia metropolitan region today. (See Figure 4). Lenape oral traditions generally assert their migration into the Delaware River valley took place in the distant past. The journey was a search for a promising environment, not divinely appointed or predestined. These cultural traditions defined the Lenape relationship to their land and how they perceived their authority in the land. Their spiritual health did not include religious dogma or doctrine that dictated their occupation of a specific place on Turtle Island. There are no sacred markers on the landscape that delineate a boundary to defend or a sacred site that must be protected at all costs. More relevant was the productivity of the land and Lenape authority over its use, criteria not unlike those of the European colonizers they encountered. Ultimately Lenapehoking existed anywhere on Turtle Island that the Lenape settled. This premise should not be interpreted to suggest that the Lenape were a nomadic or rootless people. Quite the contrary. They claimed very specific boundaries and negotiated, fought for and lost territories and resources to other Indians and European colonists. How they delineated the territory they claimed authority over rested in their historic occupation and use of those lands.

Many Lenape communities, families and individuals in eighteenth century Pennsylvania made conscious decisions to relocate to lands north and west. The changing demographics of their homelands compromised their ability to live a good life. These decisions were traumatic, but their understanding of where Lenapehoking existed facilitated their ability to resettle on other lands successfully. They held a very different set of values regarding the geographic specifics of their homeland and the meanings attached to the landscape. The Lenape imbued their physical environments with sacred identities and familiar meaning like many other indigenous Americans, but these ideas should not be confused with boundary and land use issues. The Lenape were willing to defend their territory but the boundaries that defined Lenapehoking were not limited to a set of specific topographic features in environs of southeastern Pennsylvania. Given the cultural success of the Lenape into the twentieth century it is likely that the philosophical and ideological convictions were critical to their cultural, economic and political survival in the face of constant land dispossessions.

The Lenape faced Indian and European attempts to take control of their occupied lands with consistent resistance throughout the colonial period. Lenape communities adapted and responded to the intense changes brought by European colonization by seeking out diplomatic solutions to the conflicts that arose during this period. The sophisticated diplomacy practiced by the Lenape predated their first encounters with the Dutch and Swedes and is evident in their largely successful co-existence with the belligerent Susquehannock. Just as the Swedish, Dutch and English immigrants employed a variety of economic and political strategies to gain access to the resources and lands they sought to control, Lenape, Susquehannock, Iroquois and Shawnee communities in turn used a variety of tactics to protect and promote their own prosperity in this rapidly changing world. When examined from this perspective, Lenape diplomacy can be credited for creating the economic and political stability necessary for the success of William Penn’s colonial enterprise. The origins of this benevolent and tolerant Lenape diplomacy is evident in their unique cultural history.

The history of the Indians in Pennsylvania⁵ and more specifically, the history of the Lenape, can begin at any number of chronological points depending on the evidence one utilizes. Material evidence, as well as oral evidence illuminates the emergence of a distinct Lenape culture in the mid-Atlantic far deeper in the past than the first written accounts of 1524 or 1609.

The Lenape, living in southeastern Pennsylvania between 3000 b.c.e. – 1000 c.e., settled in small groups living in close range to a single and fixed critical resource (food and fresh water or tool making material) with occasional forays to other locations as needed. The boundaries of these settlements were limited, as were the territories they used and they participated in a ritualized trade system, linked by the rivers and bays, that likely exposed them to diverse cultures to the north, south and west. It is probable these were kin-based settlements with communal-based political and economic organization.

Between 1000 c.e.- 1500 c.e., settlement patterns changed suggesting the development of a more settled lifeway linked to organized agricultural production. This shift from gathering of plant foods to food production occurred gradually. One could question whether a real difference exists between intensive gathering of plant foods and agriculture, the organized planting, sowing and harvesting of plant foods. If Lenape regularly visited an area within the boundaries of the territory they utilized to gather poke (Phtyolacca decandra), a wild plant used as food and medicine, and they weeded, pruned and harvested this plant, are they gatherers or are they farmers? Acknowledging the relationship between these two forms of food production is important to recognizing the rise of Lenape culture in pre-European southeastern Pennsylvania.

In the two centuries before European contact, the Lenape began to engage in a more complex agricultural production. While the cultivation of domesticated food plants (corn, beans, squash) continued to be secondary to wild plant food for sometime, the gradual change stimulated their move from estuarine settings to the fertile floodplains of the river systems.⁶ Domesticated food plants production altered Lenape culture substantially. The production of surplus required methods of preserving the food. As the settlements invested more energy in the development of food cultivation, storage and preservation, Lenape society became more sedentary. Along with more reliable and abundant food sources came an increase in population and the appearance of more permanent villages. All of these changes culminated during the period when Europeans first encountered and observed the Indians of southeastern Pennsylvania. Though the Lenape were not large-scale agriculturists during this cultural stage, the production of domesticated food plants proved to be critical to the flexibility of the Lenape during the contact. The Lenape that Europeans initially encountered were living in small kin based, permanent and semi-permanent villages within recognized territories of trade, agriculture, foraging, hunting and social interaction.⁷ The Europeans quickly recognized these reliable trade partners and cultivated a relationship with the Lenape.

The intrusion of the Susquehannock culture into Eastern Pennsylvania, an Iroquoian speaking population that migrated south from New York into the Susquehanna River valley coincided with the initial European contacts in the sixteenth century. ⁸ By 1500, the Iroquoian-speaking Susquehannocks were migrating into the Susquehanna River valley from the north. A century later, they had not only settled into the southern reaches of this river system, but dominated the new Indian-European trade in the region. What is important to this discussion is the Lenape response to this intrusion and the role they would play in this economic exchange. The Susquehannock introduced a different set of skills and merchandise into the region including new pottery making methods and designs, stone pipes, intricately carved wood and bone combs, and amulets. These new trade items reflected cultural influences from the north and west. One of the most interesting items introduced into southeastern Pennsylvania’s indigenous marketplace were beads, pipes and calumets made from catlinite, which comes from specific quarries in Wisconsin and southern Minnesota.⁹ Eventually, the fur trade would come to dominate all indigenous cultures in the northeast, directly or indirectly, and the Susquehannock and Lenape were no exception. At the opening of the seventeenth century Iroquoian people to the north were already active participants in the exchange with the French. John Smith observed in 1608 that the Susquehannock possessed trader's goods.¹⁰

The Susquehannock introduced more than just material goods and new trade connections into Lenapehoking. At the same time the Lenape were moving into the fertile floodplains of southeastern Pennsylvania, the Iroquoian people to the north were emerging out of a period of destructive warfare. Between 1400 and 1600 c.e., the Iroquoian people formed the League of the Haudenosaunee, or Five Nations, bringing an end to the ongoing blood feuds that had dominated the culture.¹¹ The development of this confederacy coincides with the divergence of the Susquehannock and their move into Pennsylvania. While we do not know why this divergence took place, we can speculate about the kind of political and diplomatic savvy the Susquehannock might have brought into southeastern Pennsylvania. Experience in kin-based inter-village warfare, military expertise and territorial defensive strategies were a part of the Susquehannock cultural toolkit. An understanding of the economic and social benefits of alliances and confederacies may have led the Susquehannock to take advantage of the smaller, less consolidated cultures of the Susquehanna and Delaware River valleys. The Lenape, unlike the Susquehannock, had not experienced a similar phase of warfare. Excavations of Lenape sites older than the Iroquoian intrusion show no signs of palisaded villages or other evidence of large-scale warfare.

The mid-fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries were critical for the Lenape. They faced the Susquehannock migration from the north and west and the European encounters largely from the north and east. This small, non-warring, semi-sedentary village-based culture survived, changed and successfully responded to two larger and more economically, politically, culturally and militarily aggressive cultures, Europeans and Susquehannock. Material culture evidence corroborated by various documentary sources produced by the European encounters with the Susquehannock clarifies our understanding of the Susquehannock migration into Pennsylvania and their impact on smaller groups in this region.¹² How Europeans responded to encounters with Susquehannock and Lenape peoples was documented by textual sources produced by Europeans.¹³ How we understand the Lenape response to these two groups rests on a desperately limited body of physical and documentary evidence.

Between 1500 and 1575, the Susquehannock settled into the river valley that bears their name, with the furthest southern reaches of their occupation near present-day Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Their immigration into this region left a glaring set of footprints on the cultural landscape. As they moved into this region, smaller riverine groups were subsumed within the dominant Susquehannock culture. The Shenks Ferry society had a distinct material identity that ceased to exist as a separate culture during this period.¹⁴ During the fifteenth-century the Shenks Ferry people came into conflict with another population evidenced in their building of palisaded villages. The introduction of palisades to some villages and the relocation of others to defensible sites declared the obvious: conflicts with outside groups. The final disruption of the Shenks Ferry culture and the disappearance of their villages coincided with the arrival of the Susquehannock on the southern part of the river between 1550 and 1575. By 1600 they had established a large town located in the present village of Washington Boro, Lancaster County, on the southern reaches of the Susquehanna River.

Both the Lenape and the Susquehannock began to engage in trade with Europeans early in the sixteenth century. There is little doubt the Susquehannock were responsible for introducing European trade goods into the region west of Lenapehoking. Most likely they obtained these goods from other Indian alliances and not through direct contact with the French or other European traders, either the French trade posts on the Saint Lawrence River or from other Algonquian groups to the south who had connections with the Europeans exploring the Chesapeake as early as 1524.¹⁵ Correspondingly, the Lenape gained access to these same goods through their connections in the Chesapeake as well as the New York harbors. Between 1525 and 1625, the Lenape and Susquehannock shared a geographic space that must have required some negotiation of boundaries, a shared use of space and resources, as well as use of waterways and trails. Unlike the Shenks Ferry culture, the Lenape maintained a distinct and independent identity.

Limited data from Lenape sites contemporary to this period show some cultural influence from the Susquehannock based on pottery styles.¹⁶ While this evidence is conclusive proof of a relationship between the Susquehannock and Lenape, it says little about the cultural influence or its extent. What is more important is what did not happen. Unlike the Shenks Ferry culture, the Lenape did not build defensive structures or palisaded villages and their identity was not absorbed by the Susquehannock culture. No evidence exists of increased warfare ensuing from this early contact between the two groups, though later pressures would result in a period of open hostilities between them. The Lenape managed to maintain hegemony in the region despite Susquehannock intrusion.

The Lenape, from pre-contact into the period of mass migration in the mid-eighteenth century, developed a strategy of acting more as a cultural net or mesh in the geographic region. They co-existed around, beside and in between numerous other ethnic and cultural groups exchanging with those cultures what they needed to succeed and avoiding conflict by allowing the rest to pass through the net. One factor that contributed to Lenape success was the consistent size and organization of settlements throughout this period. The small family based settlements left a small footprint on a vast expanse of territory. The Susquehannock found it difficult to raise any large scale attack against the Lenape, and there were no central settlements that could be seized and dominated. Initially, European interests were unimpaired by the small settlements that were scattered throughout the region. Even after European contact forced the relocation of many Lenape village sites from the broad floodplains to more inland locations on small tributaries, this movement did not apparently change the autonomous and dispersed quality of these communities. Lenape settlements were band based and political and economic ties binding them together were not critical to their independence. While the nature of their social, political and social organization did not rely on close contact with neighboring villages, this autonomy does not negate their connectedness.

A second factor that contributed to the continued autonomy of the Lenape was their apparent initial lack of interest in European trade goods. Archaeologists who studied the Lenape sites remain puzzled by the lack of European trade goods during this period of early contact. Despite their close proximity to European trade sources, the few sites excavated contemporary to this period show little if any use of European goods, while similar sites in other culture areas such as New England and New York demonstrate their importance.¹⁷ The lack of European materials in Lenape sites may have several possible explanations. Much of the territory occupied by the Lenape during this early period lies beneath a heavily built and occupied landscape, the greater modern Philadelphia region. While this may serve as a partial explanation, it does not account for the evidence produced from more intact, isolated sites that show few European trade items. A second explanation suggests the European trade partners in the Delaware Bay and its environs had little to offer for trade and the Lenape may have found more value in these items by passing them on to other trade partners. The Dutch and Swedes who manned the forts in this earliest period were often in dire need of supplies and had little to offer the Lenape. The patterns of dependency on European trade goods that so often proved fatal to the economic and political sovereignty of Indian societies during colonization were delayed for much of the Lenape culture in southeastern Pennsylvania. Their continued reliance on both farming and fishing, rather than any deep involvement in the fur trade placed them in a unique situation as suppliers of fish and maize to struggling Dutch, Swedish and English settlements and gave them a nominal advantage. The small size of the Lenape settlements on a vast territory and their limited involvement in the developing Indian-European trade allowed them to continue to negotiate their place in Lenapehoking while the European presence expanded around them. Lenape communities co-existed with other populations whether Dutch, Susquehannock or Swedish.

As early as 1626, the Susquehannock struggled to get past the Lenape who stood between them and a direct and profitable access to the Dutch and Swedes.¹⁸ Lenape towns were geographically located at strategic points in this trade network and as a result, the Susquehannock were forced to accept them as middlemen in many negotiations. The Swedes and Dutch in turn initially were more than happy to have the Lenape negotiators running interference between them and the Susquehannock, whom these Europeans perceived as a more volatile trade partner. By 1634, the Susquehannock struggle for direct access to the Europeans escalated into an unprecedented period of conflict between themselves and the Lenape. What demands more close examination is the relationships the Lenape were able to negotiate successfully between the expansionist, militaristic and profit-seeking Susquehannock to the west and their counterpart, the Dutch, to the east. For a century, the Lenape negotiated a peaceable kingdom in the Delaware River valley despite the numerous factors working against that peace. Before either William Penn (1682) or his agents (1680) set foot in Lenapehoking, the Lenape negotiated successful trade and land agreements with the Susquehannock, Dutch, Swedes and English. With the exception of a brief period of open conflict with the Susquehannock and the competition between the Dutch, Swedes and English to control their traditional territory, Pax Lenape prevailed. If the Lenape were responsible for creating the economically and politically stable climate that would facilitate the success of Penn’s colony, then it should be possible to recognize a pattern to their negotiations with the Dutch and Swedes. Similarly, it may also be possible to identify Dutch, Swedish and English responses to a different Indian-European political climate in the Delaware River valley than those they exhibited elsewhere on the North American continent. Perhaps by 1682, some Lenape bands recognized in William Penn an opportunity to strengthen their hegemony over Pax Lenape.

The earliest European accounts of the Lenape establish them as peaceful and enthusiastic traders. The Dutch initially encountered Lenape in 1609 near Sandy Hook Bay south of Staten Island "who seeming very glad of our coming," brought tobacco to trade for knives and beads and showed an interest in English clothing.¹⁹ Juet's account eagerly remarks that the Indians "have a great store of Maiz," a trade item that would become vital to Dutch survival when their own supplies from home ran out. Juet, an officer on Henry Hudson's Dutch ship the Halve Maen, recognized an important trade item when he saw one. As an experienced sailor and officer, he understood how vital such a resource was. The following day, according to this account, at another point on the bay, some of the crew went on land and were greeted by Lenape who presented them with gifts of tobacco and also showed them where they could find currants and acorns, both portable food sources. The Lenape came on board, men, women and children bringing dried currants and hemp, either as gifts and trade items. Juet, with an eye for marketable commodities, remarked that they were dressed in "Skinnes of divers sorts of good Furres." Despite this initial attempt by the Lenape to establish a positive and possibly profitable trade relationship, the suspicious Dutch slipped away in the night because they "durst not trust them."

Hudson's voyage in 1609 was the legal basis for the Dutch claims in the area. In order to establish and maintain their presence in the Delaware River valley the Dutch purchased lands and established several minor settlements in the first half of the seventeenth century, Burlington Island, Swanedael, Fort Nassau and Fort Beversreede. The Dutch set the colonial legal precedent in the Delaware valley for purchasing lands from the Indians to establish legal privileges against anticipated English claims to the contrary. Historians erroneously credit William Penn with establishing an exceptional and unique relationship with local Indians by purchasing land titles from them. However, the Dutch pursued a similar policy nearly a century earlier. According to Francis Jennings, this was the “singularly benevolent feature of New Netherlands.”²⁰ This policy had its origin in the competition between the Dutch and English in the East Indies. The Dutch were compelled to formally recognize Indian title to land and initiate purchases since a land grant was not a part of the company’s original charter in North America. Isaac De Rasiere, an agent for the Dutch West India Company, knew well that “a contract being made thereof and signed by them [Indians] in their manner, since such contracts upon other occasions may be very useful to the company.”²¹

The first Dutch settlements were problematic at best, suffering from poor planning, inconsistent occupation and inadequate supplies. Built in 1626, Fort Nassau, near present day Gloucester, New Jersey was the most successful of these settlements, remaining an active trade post until dismantled by Peter Stuyvesant in 1648.²² The earliest Dutch encounters on record reveal that a Lenape/Susquehannock conflict was already under way, the Lenape being forced from their settlements on the west bank of the Delaware River due to Susquehannock attacks. French Walloons (French speaking Belgians) occupying Burlington Island had already set up one trade relationship with the Susquehannock. De Rasiere, director of this settlement, reported the Susquehannock had made contact, seeking a trade relationship. The Dutch official reciprocated this arrangement and confirmed the deal with an exchange of gifts, the Indians giving ten beaver pelts and the Dutch giving duffel cloth, beads and hatchets. De Rasiere in this record remarks that “heretofore we could never get in touch” with the Susquehannock. Either the Lenape strategically prevented the Susquehannock from having direct contact with the Dutch trade or the conflict between these two Indian groups predated European trade.²³ The Susquehannock were anxious to establish a relationship with the Dutch and made a deal with de Rasiere “that when the season approached I would send them a sloop or small ship, until whose arrival they would keep the peltries."²⁴

The Susquehannock, seeking to out maneuver the fur trade competition to the north with a direct European trade partner to the east, were aware of the critical nature of negotiating a firm trade pact with the Dutch. The only limitation on this unimpaired access to Dutch trade were the Lenape whose traditional territory cut a broad barrier between the Susquehannock River Indians and the Atlantic trade coming down the Delaware River from larger ports in the north and up the Delaware river through the Delaware Bay. In this situation, the Susquehannock modus operandi was an attempt to force the Lenape into a compliant relationship in which the Susquehannock would dominate the trade arrangements with the Dutch and other Europeans they would encounter to the east. However, after a brief period of open hostilities, the Susquehannock failed to force the Lenape into a submissive economic or political role in the Delaware Valley. By 1638 the Lenape reached a peaceful and mutually beneficial understanding with their Susquehannock neighbors, returned to this location and continued their previous role as middlemen.

The Lenape were well aware of their dangerous position. In this same report, de Rasiere urged his company to secure Burlington Island by building a strong presence there. Both the English and the Swedes had designs on the region and if they built a well supplied trade post there, the Dutch would command the trade on the whole river and the control of this river trade could have grave implications for the English both to the south in the Chesapeake and to the north on the Hudson River. No one can say that the Dutch were not entrepreneurial visionaries. De Rasiere argued that the Dutch must fortify this outpost because "the natives (Lenape) say they are afraid to hunt in winter, being constantly harassed by war with the Minques (Susquehannock), whereas if a fort were there, an effort could be made to reconcile them (italics mine)."

Lenape showed little interest in or ability to cooperate in de Rasiere’s venture, although he had identified them as prospective participants in the fur trade. His attention to reconciling the differences between the Susquehannock and the Lenape however, most likely reflected his interest in securing Susquehannock access to the fur monopoly. Once the Susquehannock sought a connection to the Dutch, De Rasiere felt it was imperative that he act swiftly to solidify this relationship. A Lenape leader acted as a go-between in these Susquehannock-Dutch fur trade negotiations. A Lenape “who is at peace with them [Susquehannock], brought them here and offers to go with us and show us the kill or river where they [Susquehannock] dwell, saying that their houses are full of skins."²⁵ This unnamed Lenape individual, who likely represented one or more settlements, negotiated a safe and profitable role for his people. By acting as middlemen Lenape successfully protected their territory, and preserved and expanded an economic and political niche in these changing times. Without their skills as negotiators and their interest in preserving peace and stability, violence and chaos were inevitable.

Why was De Rasiere concerned with protecting Lenape interests if he knew they had limited access to furs? Two factors suggest that the Dutch basis for their relationship with the Lenape was different than with the Susquehannock. First, supplies to the Dutch settlements on the Delaware were sporadic and inadequate. These small settlements suffered from shortages in food, tools, building supplies and expertise. De Rasiere, in his role as director struggled to strengthen and expand the settlements. A secure Lenape-Dutch trade in maize and other foodstuffs proved to be vital to their survival. Secondly, Dutch settlers traded on their own without the sanction and authority of the province. De Rasiere tried to stabilize the power between various Lenape leaders and he feared that this illegal, unregulated trade would upset the delicate balance of power. Keeping in mind that there were no overarching political or economic ties that obligated one autonomous Lenape settlement to another, de Rasiere was doing his best to keep the peace between representatives of different Lenape factions. Writing to Holland he pleaded for the power to appoint a trustworthy diplomat who could oversee Indian negotiations. De Rasiere claimed "that the natives are treated well, each according to his station and disposition, and that when (representatives) of two or more nations are present, one chief is not shown more favor than the other."²⁶ Trying to secure Lenape friendship required a delicate touch and that "meanwhile be on one's guard or else things are apt to go wrong." The Dutch needed the Lenape for food and supplies and the Susquehannock for furs.

David Pieterszoon de Vries, provides further evidence on the economic and political niche created by the Lenape.²⁷ During the winter of 1632 and 1633 De Vries was on the Delaware trading largely for maize and beans. His first encounter in December was on the bay at Swaendael, a Dutch trading post that was destroyed as the result of a cultural misunderstanding between the Dutch and the Lenape.²⁸ The Lenape de Vries encountered were concerned that this ship was bringing a reprisal. Once it was clear that the Dutch were not their to retaliate, the Lenape proceeded to make peace with the Dutch and told their account of this incident. Swandael (present day Lewes, Delaware) was the first Dutch settlement on the Delaware Bay. The settlement was destroyed in 1632, by the Lenape. According to two Dutch sources,²⁹ the Lenape relayed the story of its destruction. Apparently, the Dutch settlers erected their royal emblem in front of their palisaded trade post. Several Lenape unknowingly offended the Dutch by taking the emblem made of copper or tin to make tobacco pipes when the post was unmanned. The Dutch overreacted when they returned and made this clear to the Lenape who came to trade. In order to rectify the situation the Lenape killed the leader who was responsible for this offense, as was their legal custom. The Dutch realized their overreaction had in turn caused another, potentially more dangerous, response and chastised the Indians for taking the law into their own hands. As a result, the relatives of the dead Lenape leader attacked the Swandael post and killed the Dutch inhabitants. Later that year, the Dutch and Lenape laid the matter to rest through negotiations, explanations and gifts.

The Dutch continued to rely heavily on the Lenape as dependable partner’s for food, rather than furs. In January 1633, food stores on the Dutch ship were dangerously low and they sought out the Lenape in order to purchase beans. Repeatedly they encountered Indians with furs to trade, but the Dutch were not interested. They needed food supplies and they had nothing of equivalent value to exchange for the furs. During this brief stay near former Fort Nassau several contingents of Lenape who had some furs instead of food to trade were turned away by the Dutch who repeatedly insisted that they came to trade food, not fur. Finally, after several days, this group of Lenape traders apparently were convinced that the Dutch did not want furs and sent nine sachems to the ship to reach peaceful terms. The Lenape sachems sealed the agreement by the presentation of one beaver pelt per leader. The Dutch attempted to reciprocate this gift exchange with axes, cloth and the like, but the Lenape refused the gifts. De Vries, surprised at this rejection reported that "they refused them [the gifts], declaring that they had not made presents in order to receive others in return, but for the purpose of a firm peace."³⁰ The Lenape were reaffirming their hegemony in the region and their willingness to continue to negotiate and trade with the Dutch. Over the course of the next few days, the Dutch traded axes, cloth and kettles for Lenape corn and beans. De Vries returned faithfully the following month seeking out the same Indians for more food supplies, only to find that these Indians had departed the Fort Nassau site. The ship stayed in the area for eight days before they finally encountered a Lenape couple in a canoe who were willing to sell some maize and beans. De Vries inquired about the lack of trade activity at a site that had been active only a month before and found the couple unwilling to talk and extremely tense about their location. The next day, it was clear why this Lenape couple had been reluctant to stay long. A war party of fifty Susquehannock approached the boat, walking across the frozen river on pieces of broken canoe they laid across the ice. The Dutch refused to allow them to board. Despite their desire to obtain food for trade, de Vries new that direct trade with the Susquehannock would betray their established relationship with the Lenape and make them vulnerable in the future. While the Dutch crew seemed disappointed at the loss of a possible trade opportunity, de Vries wisely argued this was one trade opportunity that may end in disaster. Several days later the ship met some Lenape who were retreating from a Susquehannock attack. In the attack, the Susquehannock had destroyed their stores of corn and burnt their homes. The Lenape explained "they had escaped in great want and were compelled to be content with what they could find in the woods."³¹ Foraging in the middle of winter, despite the Lenape expertise, could prove to be bleak.

Some scholars have suggested that the Lenape role in the corn trade was a brief cultural adaptation in response to the Swedish settlements that began after 1638, an argument that rests largely on the suggestion that the Lenape were not horticulturists, but foragers.³² If the Lenape adaptation to European settlements was their increased horticultural activity, then the beginning of this adaptation must have occurred much earlier than the Swedish encounter. The earliest Dutch exchange with the Lenape was a regular, dependable trade in corn and beans. For individual Lenape families this trade pattern required changes in settlement patterns and a more sedentary lifestyle in the early 1600s. Sowing and harvesting had a direct impact on the mobility of family members, especially women. In Lenape culture, women usually controlled food production, distribution and storage. In turn, the growing role the Lenape played supplying food commodities fro Europeans in the regions resulted in a greater political and economic interest in preserving lands that were best suited for these gardens, as well as lands that were located reasonably close to the areas where the commerce took place. Lenape interests rested in preserving political and economic hegemony in the region. They filled a niche in the area that did not threaten the Susquehannock or the Dutch interests, but instead provided vital services and commodities to the various trade partners.

The stable relationship with the Dutch was short lived. The irregularity of the Dutch control of the Delaware River invited encroachment by both the English and the Swedish colonists. English territories to the north in New England and to the south in Virginia posed the greatest threat to the Dutch as well as continued ongoing hostilities between the Dutch and Indians in the north. In 1634, Thomas Yong expedition, contemporary to the one lead by de Vries, sheds further light on the niche the Lenape were developing. Yong initially was introduced to the Susquehannock form of diplomacy. A group of Susquehannock leaders approached his ship and explained to the English that they had just defeated some Lenape and they "cut down their corn" and offered to share some of this plunder with the English. Although the Susquehannock were seeking trade with the English, they had no beaver pelts with them. They promised to return in ten weeks, an interval Yong misunderstood to be ten days, with beaver to trade. This exchange is significant because, the Susquehannock made a point of destroying the Lenape corn stores and crops in the field suggesting that the Lenape were horticulturists and did cultivate large surpluses of corn. Secondly, this exchange illustrates the role Lenape played on this economic battlefield. The Susquehannock knew the Lenape did not threaten their hegemony in the Delaware River valley as fur traders or as direct competitors in that exchange. The real limitations the Lenape presented to the Susquehannock were their role in the corn trade and their influence in the territory that lay between the Susquehannock interior access to furs and the Dutch trade. In their earliest and most vulnerable stage of development Dutch, Swedish and English settlements required a reliable source of food. What the Susquehannock did not know was how much, how little or for how long the Europeans would honor or need this alliance with the Lenape.

This same account describes another encounter between the English and Lenape to the north. The English were interested in learning about the northern sections of the Delaware River. Like many European explorers, Yong was convinced that there was a northwest passage and he imagined the Delaware River was that route. Some Lenape claimed the Susquehannock interfered with their ability to hunt elk along the northernmost reaches of the. The ensemble of Lenape, who represented different towns, formally asked the English for protection from the Susquehannock and the English pledged not only to defend them but, to pursue the Susquehannock into their own lands if they attacked the Lenape. In exchange, according to Yong, the Lenape pledged their loyalty to the English crown and no other Europeans. The Lenape "accepted the conditions and soe wee made a solemne peace, they not long departed and it was spread all over the River, that I had made peace with them . . . and I would defend them against their enemies the Minquoes (Susquehannock)."³³

The Lenape took this solemn pledge quite seriously, but after several decades of experiences, their familiarity with European treachery tempered their faith in the agreement. Some members of this entourage decided to put this pact to a test. In a unique, but telling incident, shortly after this deal was made, the English met with more Lenape further up the river who were already aware of the English pledge of protection. After these Lenape boarded the English vessel, they too, were presented with gifts, as the English had done with the other Lenape sachems down river. The youngest sachem called his people together and made a "long oration" and explained the pledge the English had made with the Lenape. Following this explanation, the English and Lenape proceeded to trade. The marketplace operated without interruption for five days. On the final night, the Lenape on shore sent out an alarm that a Susquehannock attack was underway. The younger sachem, who was spending the night on board the ship, asked that his people be allowed to board the English ship for protection. The English agreed to this request but insisted on disarming them. The next morning Yong "found this to proceed of nothing else but their pollicie to trie whether, if occasion were, I would really assist them or no."³⁴ The Lenape recognized the value of a strong alliance with the English against the Susquehannock in 1634 and knew that they could only rely on this alliance if the English passed the test. Yong refers to their "pollicie" as though this were an established pattern for the Lenape that other unsuspecting English negotiators be made aware of.

While it is difficult to ascertain when the conflict between the Lenape and Susquehannock began, its demise is clear.³⁵ In 1638, Sweden made its claim to territory on the Delaware River, adding another facet to an increasingly complicated milieu. The history of New Sweden’s first five years are poorly documented due to the loss of Peter Minuit’s account. Minuit, former second director general of New Netherlands and the organizer and leader of New Sweden’s first venture, knew the importance of establishing legitimate territorial possession of the desired lands in the Delaware Valley. The Dutch set the precedent by purchasing lands from the Indians and so Minuit, with instructions from the Swedish crown, planned to do the same. The directors knew that it was imperative they acquire deeds to Indian lands if they were going to defend their claims to their Dutch and English competitors. The initial orders given to the leader of the New Sweden Company reflected a similar policy regarding their relationship with the Lenape as rightful owners of the lands they wanted to acquire legally. Central to this policy was the Indian “sale” of lands and the issuing of a “certificate or declaration” recognizing the Swedish claim and as a result, the collective sovereignty of the Lenape in the Delaware Valley.³⁶ Until recently scholars assumed that since many of the key investors and leaders in the New Sweden Company were Dutch, it would follow that they held a charter for the company. No such document has ever been located and scholars question that a charter ever existed.³⁷

The Swedes followed European custom by first seeking out any Christians who would lay claim to the territory by firing their cannon as they sailed along the Delaware River and up Minquas Kill (Christina Creek). Having concluded no Christians lived in the territory they sought to acquire, Minuit invited “all the nations or people to whom the land really belonged to come before him.”³⁸ How the Swedes did this is not clear from the evidence. Once the attendees were present, the Swedes asked if they were willing to sell the land “lying about there, as many days’ journeys as he would request.” The Lenape later contested the land exchange with the Swedes. Lenape sachem Mattahorn, present during this exchange, gave his account to the Dutch in 1648 and 1651. He claimed that Minuit had bought only a small parcel of land, small enough to fit inside “six trees” and large enough to “plant some tobacco on it.” In 1648, Mattahorn accused the Swedes of stealing.³⁹ The consent for this land sale was agreed upon by representatives of several Lenape settlements and the Susquehannock who “all unanimously with one another declared in what manner they transported, ceded, and transferred the said land” to the New Sweden Company and they “acknowledged that they, to their satisfaction, were paid and fully compensated for it.”⁴⁰

This transaction marked the founding of New Sweden and has serious ramifications for the changing role of the Lenape in the region. The founding of Fort Christina (present day Wilmington, Delaware) at the junction of Minquas Kill and the Delaware River was a strategic move on the part of the Minuit and the New Sweden Company. Christina Kill was a direct route into the heart of Susquehannock territory by way of the Minquas Path and a direct conduit for the more abundant fur resources upriver. The presence of the Susquehannock in this negotiation would suggest that the Lenape approved of a Swedish-Susquehannock fur trade alliance. Since the Lenape had already secured a trade relationship with Europeans based on food procurement and a variety of diplomatic and communication services, they were not threatened by the Susquehannock fur trade with any European partner. The Lenape were well aware by 1638 that their participation in the fur trade was unfeasible except for very localized and limited exchanges or as middleman who would profit from their strategic location. They also knew that war with the Susquehannock interfered with the continuation of their own successful relationships with the Europeans. The Lenape were interested in stability in the region by maintaining and preserving their settlements in this strategic location. Negotiating a peace with the Susquehannock depended on their mutual agreement or recognition of the advantages of peace as well as recognition of the non-overlapping roles they could both assume in their dealings with the Europeans. By 1638, the New Sweden Company and the Swedish crown recognized the Lenape and the Susquehannock as “the people to whom the land belonged.”

Royal instructions to Johan Printz, Governor of New Sweden, in 1642 granted Swedish claims by “virtue of the deeds entered into with the wild inhabitants of the country, as its rightful owners.” His first meeting with the Indians in 1643 included representatives from the Susquehannock and Lenape people. This cooperation suggests that hostilities had been short-lived. The Swedes purchased lands from Lenape and Susquehannock representatives for different intentions. The lands purchased from the Lenape were for occupation and permanent settlements and those purchased from the Susquehannock were to establish and foster trade relationships.

The Swedish enterprise was really a Dutch-Swedish venture in the beginning. Their company was primarily interested in the tobacco trade. Thereafter, their interests shifted to the fur trade, minerals, fishing and even silk worms. None of these prospects proved to be very fruitful because the Swedes failed to establish a single successful outpost. By the time Printz assumed the governorship of New Sweden (1642) the Swedish settlers, like the Dutch and English, depended heavily on the Lenape food trade. Printz actually identified the Lenape as obstacles to the settlement’s self-sufficiency. He complained in his reports that “we have no beaver trade with them [Lenape] but only maize trade” and he further reasoned that if the Lenape were out of the way “each one could... feed and nourish himself unmolested without their maize.”⁴¹ His frustration suggests that the dependability, quantity and quality of food made available for trade by the Lenape undermined his efforts to promote the colonist’s self-sufficiency. Printz pleaded with the directors in Sweden to send supplies and a military force. He reasoned that “nothing would be better than to send over here a couple hundred soldiers, and [remain here] until we broke the necks of all of them in this River.”⁴² Printz’s reasoning is not surprising. Indian-white hostilities had irrupted in New Netherlands to the north and between Susquehannock and Maryland colonists to the south. The English and the Dutch would both accuse the Swedes of selling arms to the Indian factions with the intention of profiting from the conflicts through trade with the disaffected parties.⁴³ Neither Printz nor the last governor of New Sweden, Risingh denied these charges. Printz was pragmatic and presumed that as the colonies expanded, and inter-colonial competition increased, hostilities were inevitable. The sooner his colony became sufficient, the more likely were their chances of success. The Lenape were a crutch he did not want to rely on.

Despite the best efforts of Printz, the Swedish continued to depend on the “maize trade” throughout the colony’s existence, but the inability and unpredictability of the Swedes to acquire trade goods left the Lenape dissatisfied with their Swedish trade alliances. Risingh reports that the Lenape bought items on credit from the Swedes and traded with the Susquehannock for items that they could then in turn sell to the Dutch with a greater profit, undermining the stability of the Swedish settlements.⁴⁴ Despite the growing dissatisfaction on both sides, the Swedes continued to employ Lenape as messengers and guides. Both Printz and Risingh referred on multiple occasions to Lenape agents who carried messages of extreme importance and strategic value.⁴⁵ The records reveal no major outbreaks of violence between the Swedes and the Lenape despite multiple external pressures. The Lenape, even though they were at the center of the economic and political maelstrom of these colonial settlements, managed to avoid open conflict. Swedish historians, not unlike their Pennsylvania counterparts eulogized New Sweden’s peaceable kingdom crediting Swedish benevolence, rather than Lenape expertise and experience.⁴⁶

In 1655, the Swedish lost the colony to the Dutch, who in turn relinquished it to the English in 1664. At the close of this period of intense economic, political and social interaction, the Lenape emerged changed, but remarkably undamaged. Violence, shifting subsistence strategies and disease had all played a part in reorganizing Lenape settlements and territories. However the Lenape continued to exercise collective sovereignty in the Delaware River Valley so much so that William Penn, following the already established patterns of diplomacy approached the Lenape in the 1680s regarding land purchases.

The Lenape for their part, surely recognized in the earliest phases of the next wave of English colonial efforts, that their strength lay in negotiation, not confrontation. Through trial, error and astute observation of their competitors and adversaries they acknowledged that their power would rest in their ability to exploit the needs of both the Susquehannock and the Europeans. Providing food, alliances and loyalty, and a variety of diplomatic and communication services allowed the Lenape to create a successful political, cultural and economic niche in and around the Dutch, Swedes and the Susquehannock. Beginning in 1674 the Lenape were introduced to a new diplomatic partner, the English. The arrival of these new trade partners initially posed no threat. They were just a different group of negotiators and Lenape diplomacy was well established and prepared to respond to the new negotiations. Between 1674 and the arrival of William Penn in 1682, the Lenape continued to maintain stable diplomatic and trade relations with the English. Their neighbors, the Dutch and Swedish colonists, made similar adjustments to the new political and economic authority in the region. The English, led by Edmund Andros were astutely aware that making the transition a peaceful one would preserve the region’s economic stability. Edmund Andros understood the importance of Lenape diplomacy and initiated a relationship with them that lasted until Penn’s arrival. William Penn, credited with the establishment of an exceptional colonial policy and the creation of a “peaceable kingdom,” did not create the political, cultural and economic environment, he only inherited it. The Lenape clearly laid the groundwork for Penn’s “peaceable kingdom” and offered to extend Pax Lenape to include William Penn’s followers.

Footnotes

1. John Bierhorst, Mythology of the Lenape: Guide and Texts (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995), Daniel G. Brinton, The Lenape and Their Legends (Philadelphia: 1885).

2. Daniel Garrison Brinton and C. S. Rafinesque, The Lenãpâe and Their Legends : With the Complete Text and Symbols of the Walam Olum, a New Translation, and an Inquiry into Its Authenticity, Library of Aboriginal American Literature; No. 5. (Philadelphia: D.G. Brinton, 1885), Frank Gouldsmith Speck, Oklahoma Delaware Ceremonies, Feasts and Dances (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1937), Paul A.W. Wallace, Indians in Pennsylvania, ed. William A. Hunter, Anthropological Series (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1993).

3. David M. Oestreicher, "Unraveling the Walam Olum," Natural History 105, no. 10 (1996): 14-20.

4. Bierhorst, 5-12.

5. “Pennsylvania Indians” is a term often employed by historians of colonial Pennsylvania implying a homogenous group of people with similar responses to the European invasion. When ethnic differences are noted in modern histories, their distinctions are usually lumped into larger language groups; Algonquian (Lenape) and Iroquoian (Susquehannock, Iroquois Confederacy). While modern historians often failed to see the very real cultural distinctions within these linguistic groups, many Europeans who had the earliest encounters quickly learned that the Lenape were composed of numerous, autonomous groups that were hard to deal with in any generic fashion. It is important to recognize the Lenape culture and many of the possible variants within that ethnicity if we are to more fully appreciate this period in Pennsylvania’s history. See Edwin B. Bronner. William Penn's "Holy Experiment": The Founding of Pennsylvania 1681-1701, (New York: Temple University Press, 1962), Joseph E. Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania: A History, (New York: Charles Scribner’s sons: New York, 1976), 22-3.

6. Illick, 147.

7. Marshall J Becker, "Lenape Archaeology: Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Considerations in Light of Recent Excavations," Pennsylvania Archaeology 50, no. December (1980): p 19-30, Marshall J. Becker, "The Lenape Band Prior to 1740: The Identification of Boundaries and Processes of Change Leading to the Formation of the "Delawares"." (paper presented at the The Lenape Indian: A Symposium, Seton Hall University, 1983), p 19-32, Marshall J. Becker, "A Summary of Lenape Socio-Political Organization and Settlement Patterns at the Time of European Contact:The Evidence for Collecting Bands," Journal of Middle Atlantic Archaeology 4 (1988): p 79-83.

8. B.C. Kent, Susquehanna's Indians (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1993).

9. Kent, 160-74.

10. Philip L. Barbour, The Jamestown Voyages under the First Charter, 1606-1609: Documents Relating to the Foundation of Jamestown and the History of the Jamestown Colony up to the Departure of Captain John Smith, Last President of the Council in Virginia under the First Charter, Early in October 1609 (London: published for the Hakluyt Society by Cambridge U.P., 1969), Alison M. Quinn, Susan Hillier, and David B. Quinn, New American World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612 (New York: Arno Press, 1979).

11. James A. Tuck, "Northern Iroquoian Prehistory," in Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger, Handbook of North American Indians (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), p 322-23.

12. See the following: Francis Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration: The Susquehannock Indians in the Seventeenth Century," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 112, no. 1 (1968): 15-53, Francis Jennings, "The Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 110, no. 6 (1967), 406-24, Kent, Susquehanna's Indians, W. Fred III Kinsey, "Eastern Pennsylvania Prehistory: A Review," Pennsylvania History 50, no. 2 (1983), 69-108, John Witthoft and W. Fred Kinsey, Susquehannock Miscellany (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1959), John Witthoft and Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Indian Prehistory of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1965).

13. Acrelius, Reynolds, and Historical Society of Delaware, A History of New Sweden; or the Settlements on the River Delaware, Barbour, The Jamestown Voyages under the First Charter, 1606-1609: Documents Relating to the Foundation of Jamestown and the History of the Jamestown Colony up to the Departure of Captain John Smith, Last President of the Council in Virginia under the First Charter, Early in October 1609, Danckaerts, James, and Jameson, Journal of Jasper Danckaerts, 1679-1680, Adriaen van der Donck and Jeremiah Johnson, A Description of the New Netherlands, [1st ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), B. ed. Fernow, Documents Relating to the Dutch and Swedish Settlements, vol. 12, Documents Relating to Colonial History of New York (Albany, New York: 1877), Holm, A Short Description of the Province of New Sweden Now Called by the English, Pennsylvania in America, J. Franklin Jameson, Narratives of New Netherland, 1609-1664, Original Narratives of Early American History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), Amandus Johnson, The Swedish Settlements on the Delaware, 1638-1664 (Philadelphia: Swedish Colonial Society, 1911), Peter Mårtensson Lindeström, Amandus Johnson, and Swedish Colonial Society, Geographia Americae; with an Account of the Delaware Indians, Based on Surveys and Notes Made in 1654-1656 (Philadelphia,: The Swedish Colonial Society, 1925), Albert Cook Myers, Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey and Delaware 1630-1707, Reprint 1989 by Heritage Books, Inc. Bowie Maryland ed., Original Narratives of Early American History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912), West-Indische Compagnie (Netherlands) and Arnold J. F. Van Laer, Documents Relating to New Netherland, 1624-1626, in the Henry E. Huntington Library (San Marino: The Henry E. Huntingdon Library and Art gallery, 1924).

14. Kent, 17-20, 121.

15. James F. Pendergast, "Susquehannock's Trade Northward to New France Prior to A.D. 1608: A Popular Misconception," Pennsylvania Archaeologist 62, no. 1 (1992), 1-11.

16. Kent, 109-45.

17. Michael Stewart, The Indian Town of Playwicki [Website] (Michael Stewart Temple University, 1996 [cited July 18 2001]); available from http://www.temple.edu/anthro/stewart/, Michael Stewart, "The Middle to Late Woodland Transition in the Lower/Middle Delaware Valley," North American Archaeologist 11, no. 3 (1990): p 231-54, Michael Stewart, "Rethinking the Abbott Farm: Oral Tradition, Context, and Historic Perspective," Bulletin of the Archaeological Society of New Jersey 49 (1994): 61-5.

18. West-Indische Compagnie (Netherlands) and Van Laer, Documents Relating to New Netherlands: 1624-1626, in the Henry E. Huntington Library.

19. Robert Juet, "The Third Voyage of Master Henry Hudson, 1610," in Narratives of New Netherlands, 1609-1664, ed. J. Franklin Jameson, Original Narratives of Early American History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), p 18-37.

20. Francis Jennings, "Dutch and Swedish Indian Policies," in Indian-White Relations, Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed., Handbook of North American Indians (Washington D.C.: Smithsonion Institute, 1988), 14.

21. West-Indische Compagnie (Netherlands) and Van Laer, Documents Relating to New Netherland, 1624-1626, in the Henry E. Huntington Library, 51-2.

22. C. A. Weslager, Dutch Explorers, Traders and Settlers in the Delaware Valley, 1609-1664 (Philadelphia,: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), 18-44.

23. Jennings, 15-53.

24. West-Indische Compagnie (Netherlands) and Van Laer, Documents Relating to New Netherland, 1624-1626, in the Henry E. Huntington Library, 51-2.

25. West-Indische Compagnie (Netherlands) and Van Laer, 55-60.

26. West-Indische Compagnie (Netherlands) and Van Laer , 202-3.

27. Albert Cook Myers, Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey and Delaware 1630-1707 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959).

28. Swandael (present day Lewes, De.) was the first Dutch settlement on the Delaware Bay. The Lenape destroyed the settlement (established in 1631) in 1632. According to two Dutch sources, (de Vries in Meyers and Van der Donck in Jameson) the Lenape provided the evidence of this action. Apparently, the Dutch settlers erected the Dutch emblem before their palisaded trade post. Several Lenape unknowingly offended the Dutch by taking the emblem made of copper or tin to make tobacco pipes. The Dutch overreacted and in order to rectify the situation the Lenape killed the leader who was responsible for this offense. The Dutch realizing that their overreaction had in turn caused another, potentially more dangerous overreaction, chastised the Indians for taking the law into their own hands. As a result, the relatives of the dead Lenape leader attacked the Swandael post and killed the Dutch inhabitants. The Dutch and Lenape laid the matter to rest through negotiations, explanations and gifts when de Vries arrived later that year.

29. Jameson, Narratives of New Netherlands, 1609-1664, Albert Cook Myers, Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey and Delaware, 1630-1707 (New York,: Barnes and Noble, 1940), 24.

30. Myers, 1912, p. 22.

31. Myers, 24.

32. Carol E. Hoffecker, ed., New Sweden in America (Newark: University of Delaware Press; 1995), 121.

33. Albert Cook Myers, 42.

34. Myers, 44.

35. Jennings, 19-20, 50-53. The war between the Lenape and Susquehannock and the subsequent interpretation that the Lenape were subjugated by the Susquehannock has been the topic of considerable investigation. Two authors have been the source of this misinterpretation that has led to the ongoing misidentification of the Lenape as subjects to the Susquehannock and their tributaries. Jennings discussion successfully settles this argument citing the inaccuracy of Amandus Johnson’s interpretation based on Swedish documents. See Johnson, The Swedish Settlements on the Delaware, 1638-1664, v1, 191. Jennings further dismisses the account by Campanius Holm who wrote from the memoirs of his grandfather. His grandfather sighted few manuscript sources as evidence for his account. Holm, A Short Description of the Province of New Sweden Now Called by the English, Pennsylvania in America, 252, 58. This misinterpretation has led to further inaccuracies regarding the role of Lenape as “women” in other colonial sources.

36. Johnson, 116-19.

37. Stellan Dahlgren and Hans Norman, The Rise and Fall of New Sweden : Governor Johan Risingh's Journal, 1654-1655, in Its Historical Context (Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1988), 4-5, Jennings, "Dutch and Swedish Indian Policies," 17, Johnson, The Swedish Settlements on the Delaware, 1638-1664, 107. Both Jennings and Dahgren point out that Amandus Johnson (Johnson, 1911, 107) is the source of this erroneous assumption. While Johnson acknowledges that no charter exists he concludes that a note for “payment to the chancery for the making of privileges and other papers” is evidence enough to assume there was a charter. Dahlgren argues that if there had been such a document it would have been referred to in various contexts; letters of instruction from the crown, director’s correspondence, documents relating to disputes with English and the Dutch.

38. Myers, 40-45.

39. Amandus Johnson et al., The Instruction for Johan Printz, Governor of New Sweden: "The First Constitution or Supreme Law of the States of Pennsylvania and Delaware" (Philadelphia: The Swedish Colonial Society, 1930).

40. Myers, 40-45.

41. Johnson, 117-8.

42. Johnson, 117.

43. Johnson, 185. Lindestrèom, Johnson, and Swedish Colonial Society, Geographia Americae; with an Account of the Delaware Indians, Based on Surveys and Notes Made in 1654-1656, Beauchamp Plantagenet, "A Description of the Province of New Albion," in Tracts and Other Papers Relating Principally to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress of the Colonies in North America, from the Discovery of the Country to the Year 1776, ed. Peter Force (Washington D.C.: 1648), Vol. 2, 7.

44. Myers, 47-9.

45. Dahlgren and Norman, The Rise and Fall of New Sweden: Governor Johan Risingh's Journal, 1654-1655, in Its Historical Context, 163.

46. Maria Fur Gunlog, "Cultural Confrontation on Two Fronts: Swedes Meet Lenapes and Saamis in the Seventeenth Century" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1993), 103-5.